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vABSTRACT
Korean industrial policy, which has guided the Korean economy through nearly three
decades of spectacular growth, is showing its age. The policy has not been adjusted fully to the
new challenges facing the economy, and it has not recognized the obsolescence of its key
instruments. This paper argues that the time has come, as in other advanced industrial countries,
to disengage the govemment from managing the economy's structural development and to adopt
a new compact to delineate the responsibilities of business and government.
Under this compact, responsibility for allocating investable funds would be shifted fully
to the industrial and financial sectors, but at the price of greater competitive discipline and
regulatory oversight. Establishing this new framework presents an enormous challenge to
policy. In addition to complexities of the transition, the govemment will have to maintain
macroeconomic stability and the momentum of savings and investment, tackle the "new" market
failures associated with Korea's rising technological level, and develop new institutions to
increase the flow of information, reduce conflict, and ensure the equitable sharing of the fruits
of economic progress.
In coming to concrete policy recommendation concerning financial sector reform, the role
of the chaebol (Korean conglomerates), and the emerging new role of the state as epitomized by
Korea's legendary bureaucracy, the paper reviews Korea's industrial policy environment and the
experiences of other more developed economies. Its goal is to establish a practical agenda for
the 1990s drawing upon Korea's traditional strengths but adapting to current circumstances.
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FOREWORD
One of the keys to Korea's success has been its effective trade and industrial strategy.
A remarkable feature of Korea's industrial policy history was its comprehensive nature and the
strong and effective links between public policy and private initiative. Intrinsic to this policy
nexus has been the role of the financial sector. The second remarkable feature of Korean policy
has been its flexibility and effective implementation. Recent economic and political events are
forcing more rapid change in Korean policy towards the financial sector, towards conglomerates,
and towards the way in which government policy is managed. This paper examines the
challenges currently facing Korean policymakers and provides concrete recommendations for
new policy directions in the areas of financial sector reform, regulatory changes and policies
towards conglomerates. As such it attempts to set an agenda for the 1990s.
Callisto E. Madavo
Director
East Asia Department I
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INTRODUCTION
Industrial policy remains at the center of the debate about Korea's economic future. To
some, Korea's industrial policy has lost its creative edge by abandoning selective, strategic
support of industry. To others, despite pronouncements to the contrary, the government is still
pursuing an interventionist strategy that is poorly suited to Korea's modem, complex economy.
And to still others, there is a need for a new model, rooted neither in Korea's past nor the
elusive "laissez faire" of economics textbooks. But perhaps the most striking contrast with the
past is that controversy and even confusion have taken the place of the self-confident, definitive
policies of earlier periods.
The central theme of this paper is that Korean industrial policy, despite its rapid
transformation over the last decade, has not kept pace with the enormous change-political and
economic, domestic and international-in the country's policy environment. The "right"
industrial policy depends on constantly changing factors: the nature of market failures facing the
economy, and the scope and effectiveness of policy instruments available to government. Some
market failures vanish with economic growth, while others take their place at more advanced
stages of development. Instruments that are appropriate in one economic environment become
ineffective, illegal, or too risky in others. And the evolution of political institutions may change
how a particular instrument is used, so that, over time, the same instrument may produce
different and less satisfactory results.
Korea is at a crucial turning point. Of course, its recent economic performance has been
excellent, notwithstanding that growth rates have now dropped below the double-digit rates of
the mid-1980s. But the increased incidence of conflicts between government and business
suggests troubling contradictions in economic policymaking. Korea's policy goals are
increasingly those of an advanced industrial economy-to become more competitive in advanced
industries and to maintain market shares in key world markets. Yet the most visible instruments
of Korean industrial policy, including especially credit policy, have been inherited from a
simpler economy. These tools are not well adapted to addressing the country's new economic
objectives and are rapidly becoming politicized. As we shall argue, this conflict between goals
and means is undermining the credibility of industrial policy and is delaying the development
of institutions that will have to be important in the economy's next phase of growth.
This paper argues for a "new compact" between business and government as the core of
the policy approach of the 1990s. This compact would disengage the government from direct
intervention, especially in the financial sector, and shift authority over resource allocation to the
private sector. To balance these new freedoms, private firms would be exposed to greater
competitive pressure and firmer regulatory oversight. Government would focus its attention on
maintaining a firm but predictable regulatory environment, building greater consensus around
a vision of a fair and sophisticated economy, and developing the human and technological
resources required to make this vision a reality.
A shift to such a compact is consistent with the policy experiences of the several major
industrial economies reviewed in this paper. As in France, such a compact may be difficult to
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develop because the bureaucracy, used to its traditionally important (and highly successful)
leadership role, will be reluctant to relinquish its authority. Yet the need for a shift could
become especially urgent-and even more difficult to engineer-if the ongoing democratization
process puts an end to the insulation of Korea's technocratic bureaucracy.
THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY MENU
Rationales for Intervention
Just why an economy should utilize industrial policy is subject to much confusion. Some
authors treat the question of industrial policy almost as a choice between religions-between the
"old" Anglo-Saxon economics of competitive markets, and the "new" political economy of
government-directed capitalism. This is a false dichotomy. Modern analysis provides both
rigorous rationales for industrial policy, and arguments against interventions based on several
popular justifications.
Some of the frequently cited goals of industrial policy are not supported by rigorous
analysis. For example, although there are good reasons to shift resources from slow to fast-
growing sectors in the course of economic development, this does not itself require an active
industrial policy because market forces (barring critical distortions) would also generate such
shifts. Still other popular goals provide a recipe for losses rather than benefits. One popularly
cited goal is to raise the value added of domestic industry by supporting high-value-added
branches. Yet this typically requires the transfer of capital from productive uses in labor-
intensive (and therefore low-value-added) industries to relatively unproductive uses in capital-
intensive (and high-value-added) industries. For example, Yoo (1990) has estimated that in the
early 1970s capital was used approximately four times as productively in Korea's clothing and
footwear sector as in other manufacturing sectors.
Over the 1980s, however, rigorous arguments for industrial policy have been developed
in some detail. One category of arguments focuses on externalities associated with specific
industries. Some activities create technology or improve resources in such a way that the
investing firm cannot fully capture the benefits as private profit. In these cases, protection or
subsidization can expand the scale of the externality-generating activity and create social gain.
At early stages of industrialization, a new firm may create externalities simply by importing a
foreign technology and proving to other firms that foreign techniques can be successfully adapted
to local conditions. In more advanced economies, externalities are likely to be limited to newer,
technology-intensive industries. In mature economies, industrial adjustment may also involve
externalities-for example, under the social arrangements of advanced economies, much of the
cost of maintaining and relocating unemployed workers is borne by the state. In this context,
industrial intervention may be designed to smooth the private adjustment process in order to
minimize the socially borne costs of unemployment.
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A second category of arguments focuses on strategic support for domestic firms in global,
oligopolistic markets. In this setting, appropriate govemment intervention can help domestic
firms capture (from foreign firms) a larger share of the international "pool" of excess profits.
These strategic arguments apply most directly in intemationally concentrated markets such as
aircraft. Even in this "ideal" industry, empirical studies do not suggest that countries have been
able to capture large benefits from strategic trade policy. The case is weaker for relatively
competitive sectors such as automobiles and semiconductors, where all but a few companies fail
to make significant profits.
Thus, while it is now recognized that industrial policy can be justified, it is also clear that
many conventional arguments for it do not pass analytical scrutiny. The case for intervention
is strongest for new, export-oriented industries (which facilitate the diffusion of foreign
technology) in developing economies, and new technology-intensive industries (which result in
inappropriable gains to other firms and sectors) in advanced economies. Intervention may be
also justified in declining sectors if some rigidity distorts the economy's internal ability to adjust.
Yet the arguments for industrial intervention are typically subtle. There is little justification for
using such simple indicators as sectoral growth rates or value-added ratios to direct industrial
policy; the rationale has to be based on estimates of elusive extemalities.
Costs of Intervention
The key argument against intervention is that faulty intervention is worse than neutrality;
poor targeting diverts resources from economically beneficial activities to inefficient ones.
Governments often follow a "hunch" to support a particularly prestigious or difficult technology,
without any clear evidence of market failure. Examples of such mistakes abound in the
industrial policies of Europe (Concorde) and Japan (artificial intelligence), and they have also
resulted in costly mistakes in Korea. Instances of faulty targeting have continued even after the
costly "white elephants" of the heavy and chemical industry promotion drive; the Korean
government was slow to support the development of microcomputers and memory chips, which
now appear to be major winners, but it did support the development of a minicomputer that is
unlikely to find a market beyond government-related procurement (Clifford 1991).
In some policy environments industrial policy may not even get a fair chance to be
successful, because targets are chosen on political rather than economic criteria. To a greater
or lesser extent, political institutions tilt intervention in favor of powerful, rather than
economically meritorious, industries. Established, "sunset" sectors will often have an especially
strong advantage against emerging "sunrise" sectors. Moreover, given the possibility that
politically strong groups can manipulate industrial policy, the support for an active approach is
likely to be greatest in countries that have powerful special interests. For these reasons, in some
political circumstances industrial policy is more likely to be misdirected than accurately targeted.
Even correctly targeted intervention has costs. The taxes required to finance industrial
subsidies, for example, withdraw resources from other activities and distort economic decisions
in the taxed sectors of the economy. Alternatively, policies that raise a targeted sector's
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revenues through protection tend to distort the consumption decision and reduce welfare. And
intervention can draw substantial resources into nonproductive activities such as lobbying.
Thus the decision to adopt an active industrial policy ultimately involves the weighing
of costs and benefits. The question is not whether a particular industrial objective is desirable,
but whether industrial policies make the achievement of the objective more likely, and whether
the incremental contribution outweighs the risks and costs involved. Korea's future policies
must be evaluated with these demanding criteria in mind. There is no single, durable conclusion
in the industrial policy debate; past successes provide little guidance for the future. The answers
vary across industries, countries, and time.
Instruments of Intervention
The effective implementation of industrial policies requires sophisticated institutions for
setting policy goals and efficient instruments. Targeting requires a great deal of information and
difficult technical judgments. Thus active industrial policies require a powerful, capable,
technocratic institution that is, on one hand, sheltered from the political process, and on the
other, well connected to industry expertise. This requirement has been met in only a small
number of countries, including Korea. As we discuss below, it appears that economic decision
making is becoming politicized in Korea, and that the business-government relationship is now
more strained than would be desirable from the viewpoint of information flows. Much will
depend on how Korea's democratization process evolves-specifically, whether it moves toward
the stable, single-party model that has helped to keep the bureaucracy insulated in Japan.
In a market setting, industrial policy also requires instruments that substantially change
the incentives facing industry. This can mean lowering input costs or increasing revenues. The
instruments that operate on costs include direct subsidies on (or preferential access to) capital,
energy, imports, and other key inputs. The main instruments that operate on revenues are
protection from domestic or foreign competition and government procurement. Because an
economy with relatively small markets (Korea fits this category for many of the advanced
products it now makes) is limited in using its own markets to support the development of new
industries, Korea has relied largely on cost-reducing instruments to implement its industrial
policies, including especially directed credit.
The range of available, legal instruments has sharply narrowed over time. Many of the
instruments of industrial policy have been controlled or declared illegal by intemational
agreements. Protection through tariffs has been gradually eroded by successive GATT rounds.
The direct use of subsidies in export-oriented industries has been curtailed under the GATF
Subsidies Code and in the face of aggressive countervailing actions by the United States and
other countries. A Procurement Code has also begun to limit the extent to which govemments
can give preference to their own producers. Finally, for reasons of domestic economic
efficiency, most countries have liberalized trade and permitted greater competition in domestic
markets, further limiting the scope for setting industrial incentives. As a result of these changes,
the industrial policies of most advanced countries have shifted either toward greater neutrality
(as in the case of Germany and Japan) or toward greater reliance on credit policy, competition
policy, and functional support for technology as the main instruments of industrial policy.
Industrial Policies in Advanced Countries
A comparison of industrial policies across industrial economies reveals a surprisingly
wide range of institutions and policies. The main trends in industrial policy are outlined in
Tables 19.1 and 19.2 for the four largest industrial countries. The table shows that the
objectives of policy have varied widely, both across countries and within countries over time.
France has had highly variable policies, including periods of aggressive intervention in
the 1960s and early 1970s, and again in the mid-1980s. Industrial interventions were scaled
back substantially outside these periods. German policies have experienced more moderate
shifts, with a period of relatively intense involvement in the 1970s preceded and followed by
more neutral policies. Japan's industrial policies moved gradually from intensive intervention
in the 1950s and 1960s to general, functional approaches in the 1980s. Throughout, however,
Japan has maintained powerful institutions for facilitating dialogue and information exchange
between government and industry. The United States has no central institutions charged with
setting industrial policy. Considerable research support is provided through defense-related
procurement and research, and from time to time the government has also become involved in
industrial adjustment and rescue efforts through ad hoc interventions. Overall, the U.S. policy
stance has been procompetitive and relatively neutral (Table 19.1).
Some general conclusions appear to hold for all four economies. First, the use of
directed credit has declined over time, spurred by the increased sophistication and international
integration of capital markets. France, which departed from this trend briefly in the early 1980s
by nationalizing its major banks and establishing policy priorities for the allocation of credit,
paid a high price in accelerated inflation, payments deficits, and lost growth.
Second, policies that have encouraged mergers and combinations and discouraged
combinations involving foreign firms have also been largely abandoned. (In the United States
a reverse policy trend has occurred: antitrust policies are used with declining frequency to
prevent mergers even of horizontal competitors.) In recent years, both national and
international merger activity has accelerated in anticipation of the single European market and
under the pressure of international competition.
Third, subsidies and preferential government procurement remain important,
notwithstanding international agreements that limit the use of these instruments for internationally
traded commodities. Table 19.3 shows that subsidies are equal to approximately 2 percent of
GDP in Europe, 1 percent in Japan, and 0.6 percent in the United States. The composition of
subsidies (as shown for Germany in Table 19.4) generally favors declining sectors such as
agriculture, mining, and shipbuilding; basic social-sector industries such as transportation,
education, housing, and health; and one infant industry, aerospace.
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Table 19.1. Objectives and institutions of industrial policy
United States West Germany France Japan
Historical Emphasis on maintaining Neutral until mid-1960s; Increasingly ambitious Emphasis on heavy
evolution neutral, competitive from 1966 on concerted plans until mid-1960s; industry until late
environment and on focus on high-technology starting in 1966 emphasis 1960s and on
defense capability. industries. Substantial on concentrating knowledge-intensive
Since early 1980s support for declining investments in national industry since.
relaxation of antitrust industries in late champions. From mid- Gradually relinquished
policy and ad hoc 1970s; shift to greater 1970s retrenchment to most selective
interventions to support neutrality and narrower portfolio of instruments: abandoned
declining and privatization in 1980s. high-technology exchange controls in
import-threatened projects. In 1980s 1962 and formally
industries. Debate on broad nationalization liberalized trade
more focused industrial effort tried and between 1960 and
policy remains abandoned; focus now on late 1970s. Policies
unresolved. technology and now concentrate on new
privatization. technologies.
Dominant Maintain competition; Promote new technology; Develop "industries of Develop technology for
policy develop defense support declining the future"; achieve knowledge-intensive
objectives technology; prevent industries and promote international industry; facilitate
system-threatening adjustment. competitiveness; adjustment.
bankruptcies; moderate facilitate adjustment;
import threat. foster national
champions.
Implementing Department of Defense; Economics Ministry; Ministry of Industry, Ministry of
institutions Trade Representative and "concertation" councils Planning Commission; Intemational Trade and
other trade-oriented with government-business economywide and Industry; "visions";
ageneies; ad hoc -union representation. sectoral-indicative business-government-
legislative pressure and plans; state-owned banks public sector councils;
Presidential commissions. and firms; dialogue with dialogue with firms
industry associations. and industry.
Sources: Entries for each country are based on the following: United States: Wachter and Wachter (1981), Wescott (1983), BehrTnan
(1984), OECD (1989c); West Germany: Weiss (1984), Wagenhals (1983), USITC (1984), Smith (1983), Legler (1990),
OECD (1986), OECD (1986b); France: Franko and Behrman (1984), USITC (1984), Adams and Stoffaes (1986), OECD
(1989a), DeWitt (1983); Japan: Lee and Yamazawa (1990), Taylor and Yamamura (1990), USITC (1983), Fukushima
(1984), Behrman (1984), Adams and Ichimnura (1983), Komiya, Kuno, and Suzumura (1989).
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Table 19.2. Instruments of industrial policy
United States West Germany France Japan
Credit Private banks and private Most industry financing Directed credit was Group-related banks
policy equity, bond and venture- is handled by large pervasive during early provide most capital.
capital markets finance private banks, which 1980s. Government- Direct lending through
industry. Government also oversee manage- owned or controlled the Japan Development
guarantees are provided ment through equity financial institutions Bank modest since early
in exceptional positions. The govern- (esp. Caisse de 1960s. Until liberali-
system-threatening ment directly provides Depots and Credit zation in 1980s the
circumstances. export credit and National) accounted for cost of capital was
some venture capital. significant share of below world levels.
credit provided to Various policies promote
business. Additional savings. Entry in
funds are available for financial sector is
specific policy pur- restricted and banks are
poses. Aggressive subject to "window
denationalization and guidance" from Bank of
decontrol under way. Japan.
Taxes and Accelerated depreciation Special tax benefits are Various tax exemptions Although tax credits and
subsidies promoted investment in used to implement are used to promote new deferrals played an
1980s; new investment regional objectives and investment and mergers. important role in early
incentives now modest energy policy, and to There is a substantial industrial policy, tax
due to equalized eamed support declining tax credit for R&D. rates have become
income and capital-gains industries such as coal Subsidies provided for relatively uniform
tax rates. and steel. state-owned industry. across industries since
mid-1970s.
Protection Antidumping and subsidy Protection has declined, Tariffs and quotas are Formal barriers are
laws and 301 clause except in politically set by the EEC, but modest. Low rate of
provide leverage for important sectors such special procedures have manufactured imports
negotiating voluntary as agriculture, been used at times to suggests invisible
export restraints (VERs) forestry, mining, and protect favored barriers, most likely
by other countries. textiles. industries. Foreign operating through the
Some declining industries investment is invited in distribution system.
are protected by quotas high-technology areas Foreign investment is
and VERs. but is controlled for also surprisingly limited.
strategic considerations.
Competition Until early 1980s Anticartel policy has Mergers were Mergers were encouraged
policy antitrust policy was been in force since the encouraged between the until the mid-1970s.
aggressively aimed at early 1950s, but mid-1960s and early Anticartel policies are
preventing market exemptions have been 1980s to create weak; relatively high
dominance. Policy has granted in distressed 'national champion" prices suggest that
been more permissive industries and some firms. producers exercise
since and antitrust mergers were market power in domestic
exemptions are encouraged in markets. Officially
available for joint the 1970s. sanctioned cartels
research. operate in depressed
industries.
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Table 19.2. (continued)
United States West Germany France Japan
Science and Considerable research Extensive support is Specific industries are MITI-sponsored joint
technology and development offered to research from designated as industry research
financed by the the govemment directly "industries of future." projects have been
Defense Department, and from commercial Ministry of Research linked to major
but the government has R&D spurred by merged into Ministry of improvements in the
resisted redirecting fiscal incentives. Industry to facilitate competitiveness of key
these funds to non- coordination of research industries.
military applications. and industrial policies
Since the 1980s two and greater spending on
major research R&D.
consortia have been
developed.
Government Defense procurement Govemment ownership Half of economy, Little direct owner-
participation plays an important role in several major indus- including all major ship. Government
in high-technology trial firms divested banks, nationalized in procurement favors
demand. in the 1980s. Govem- early 1980s. Govemment domestic industry.
ment procurement procurement supports
favors domestic domestic producers.
products. Aggressive privatization
now under way.
Table 19.3. Subsidies in OECD countries (General government, percentage of GDP)
Country 1982 1988
France 2.2 1.9
Germany 1.8 2.2
Japan 1.4 1.0
United States 0.8 0.6
Source: OECD (1989b).
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Table 19.4. Structure of subsidy rates: Germany (Subsidy as percentage of value added)
Sector 1973-74 1979-82
Agriculture, forestry 88 180
Electricity, gas 4 3
Coal mining 30 93
Other mining 16 19
Iron and steel 1 4
Oil refining 4 4
Shipbuilding 12 30
Aerospace 65 32
Food and beverages 0 0
Construction 1 2
Trade 1 1
Railways 168 100
Shipping 28 21
Other transport 16 17
Postal services 4 10
Credit institutes 3 1
Insurance 5 10
Housing 51 57
Education service 22 18
Health and veterinary service 13 17
Other services 2 2
Source: OECD (1986).
Table 19.5. R&D spending in OECD countries (Percent)
1963 1975 1981 1987
Share of R&D in GDP
France 1.50 1.80 1.97 2.28
Germany 1.40 2.22 2.42 2.71
Japan 1.20 1.96 2.32 2.78
United States 2.90 2.27 2.45 2.72
South Korea 0.42 0.64 1.78
Share of R&D financed by industry
France --- 68 68
Germany --- 82 84
Japan --- 98 98
United States --- 68 66
Korea 33 56 80
Sources: Wescott (1983), Nelson (1990): data on Korea is from the Korean Ministry of Science and Technology.
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Table 19.6. Structure of R&D expenditures: 1980 (R&D spending as percentage
of output)
France Germany Japan U.S.
Aerospace 14.1 21.6 1.0 36.1
Office machines 10.1 6.5 5.9 19.3
Electronics 11.4 8.1 6.2 14.4
Pharmaceuticals 5.1 8.3 8.8 9.5
Scientific instruments 2.5 2.1 2.8 10.5
Electrical machinery 1.6 8.1 3.5 7.3
Automobiles 2.1 2.7 2.8 3.0
Chemicals 1.9 3.4 3.0 1.7
Other manufacturing 5.4
Nonelectrical machinery 0.6 2.3 1.7 1.8
Rubber, plastics 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.2
Nonferrous metals 0.6 0.6 2.3 0.7
Stone, clay, glass 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0
Food, beverages 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2
Shipbuilding 0.2 0.6 3.6
-Oil refineries 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.7
Ferrous metals 0.3 0.6 1.1 0.6
Fabricated metals 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.6
Paper, printing 0.2 0.1 0.4
Wood, furniture 0.2 0.3
Textile, footwear 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
Average 2.0 2.1 1.6 2.6
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Table 19.7 Export shares of technology-intensive products (Percent)
Country 1965 1975 1984
France 7.3 8.4 7.7
Germany 16.9 16.8 14.5
Japan 7.3 11.6 20.2
United States 27.5 24.5 25.2
Korea' 0.0 0.5 2.9
Source: McCulloch (1990), World Bank estimates.
a. Estimates based on exports of electrical goods, electronic equipment, and transport equipment.
Table 19.8. Total factor productivity growth (Percent per annum)
1960-73 1973-79 1979-86
All manufacturing
France 5.3 2.9 1.4
Germany 3.4 2.4 1.4
Japan 5.6 3.5 4.2
United States 2.5 0.3 2.7
Korea 2.7'
Machinery/equipment
France 3.8 3.3 -0.2
Germany 2.4 2.2 1.3
Japan 6.2 6.0 9.2
United States 5.2 0.5 4.0'
Sources: OECD (1989a), Zeile (1991).
a. 1972-85.
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Fourth, policies aimed to promote technology have become more prominent. As Table
19.5 shows, R&D spending increased in the 1980s in each of the four developed economies
analyzed in comparison with Korea. The private sector performs two-thirds of this R&D in the
private sector in Europe and the United States, and nearly all in Japan, but in all countries
private R&D spending is vigorously encouraged by tax advantages. While subsidies favor
declining industries, not surprisingly, R&D spending favors new and emerging sectors. As
Table 19.6 shows, R&D expenditures were highest in such industries as aerospace and
computers; intermediate in heavy industries subject to rapid change, such as automobiles and
chemicals; and lowest in stable industries such as foods and beverages, shipbuilding, and oil
refining.
Despite considerable variations in the thrust and intensity of industrial policies, it is
difficult to find a relationship between industrial policy and economic performance, either across
countries or over time. Since industrial policies typically aimed to increase the production of
advanced manufactured goods, it is surprising to see that France, Germany, and the United
States had essentially constant market shares in the world exports of technology-intensive goods
over the 1965-84 period (Table 19.7). Japan substantially increased its market shares over this
time, and especially so during the most recent decade, under moderating and increasingly
functional interventions. There is also no obvious relationship between policy approaches and
productivity growth (Table 19.8). In France, productivity growth was slowest during the period
of the most intense industrial policy activity, and especially so in the machinery and equipment
industries targeted by French policies. The United States, which had no coordinated industrial
policies at any time during this period, lagged behind Europe in the 1970s but outperformed
Europe in the 1980s.
Overall, there is a tendency for interventions to moderate with economic maturity. This
trend is evident in the pattern of intervention across the four industrial countries, and also within
Germany and Japan over time. Other similarities between Japan and Germany, the two most
successful industrializers of the last 50 years, may be much more important than their
approaches to policy. In these countries national policy goals were shared by business and
labor, and easily implemented through effective industry-financial-sector relationships. Special
linkages between banks and firms in these economies helped to finance risky, long-term
investments without government intervention. Both countries also pursued policies that were
largely market-conforming, and both eventually converged on R&D support as the centerpiece
of their industrial policy.
KOREA'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY ENVIRONMENT
Evolution of Korean Policies
The broad outline of Korean industrial policy is captured by the three-period approach
popularized by the World Bank (1987). In the first phase that began in the mid-1960s, policies
favored exports in general, without specific sectoral biases. The exchange rate was set
competitively and a wide range of interventions helped to offset the anti-export bias of the trade
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regime (Westphal 1978). Credit allocations favored exporters, reflecting higher social returns
on export-oriented investments than on import-substituting investments. This regime rewarded
size and growth with access to scarce capital and set the stage for the formation of large family-
owned firms and the future trend toward the concentration of Korean industry.
The second policy phase, spanning the mid-1970s, was characterized by intense, selective
interventions favoring heavy and chemical industry (HCI). No other period in Korea's recent
economic history has produced as much controversy as this episode. Initially treated as a fiasco
by most Korean scholars, it has been reevaluated in recent years in a more neutral (World Bank
1987) and even favorable light (Amsden 1989; Auty 1991; and Wade 1990). The HCI policy
was implemented through directed, subsidized credit, selective protection, regulations affecting
industrial entry, and direct government involvement in industrial decision making. The regime
had some of the expected negative consequences: inappropriate industry choices, excessively
capital-intensive investments in the targeted sectors in an otherwise capital-starved economy, and
the retardation of trade and financial liberalization. But it also had positive results: a discrete
jump in Korea's "level of industrialization," the development of some potentially world-class
firms, and inroads into lucrative, Japanese-dominated markets (Petri 1988; Leipziger and Song
1991).
The third policy phase began as Korea abandoned HCI preferences during the traumatic
economic adjustments of 1979-81 (see Cho 1988; Leipziger and Petri 1988; Zeile 1990). The
policy shift was hastened by severe problems in the nontargeted, labor-intensive sectors of the
economy and by the balance-of-payments crisis created by the second oil shock. The shift away
from intensive interventions in heavy industry was well timed. It permitted Korea to take
advantage of the boom in manufactured exports in the mid-1980s and allowed it to embark on
a trade liberalization path that was essential for maintaining a cooperative relationship with the
United States. Korea also began to liberalize its financial sector, but, as shown below, much
less progress was made in this field.
The functional thrust of Korea's new industrial policy was formalized by the Industrial
Development Law of 1985 and the simultaneous repeal of selective industrial promotion laws.
Support for research and technology (R&D) replaced directed credits as the mainstay of policy.
Yet government did not abandon ad hoc industrial interventions. It restricted entry into
industries where size was thought to be necessary for export success; for example, Samsung was
prohibited from entering the automobile market a number of times in the 1980s. The
government sharply disciplined Kukje (the sixth largest chaebol at the time), but came to the
rescue of other conglomerates heavily involved in shipbuilding, machinery, and other
overextended industries. It also helped to rationalize "sunset industries" such as shipping and
overseas construction with government-mandated mergers, divestitures, and closings. 1/ Most
importantly, it kept the badly damaged financial sector solvent.
1/ For details of the shipping rationalization program, for example, see World Bank
1987, Volume 2).
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Under the Industrial Development Law, eight industries have been rationalized.2/
Textiles were given three years to adjust, and dyeing two; and both were granted access to
subsidized loans to modernize their equipment.3/ Two other industries designated for
rationalization, ferro-alloys and fertilizers, were both uneconomic in Korea as far as one can
judge. The former was treated in a fashion analogous to Japanese restructuring under the
Depressed Industries laws.4/ Specifically, two existing copper-smelting firms were merged
into a domestic monopoly, future entry was barred, and the industry was thus "saved." In
manganese steel, three firms were designated to supply the Pohang Steel Company on a long-
term, exclusive basis, under a contract arranged by MTI.
One basic question that arises is whether an independent banking sector would have been
willing to finance these restructurings. If not, was some fundamental market failure involved?
The fact is that it is difficult to find here the externalities that would usually justify industrial
policy. With the possible exception of dyeing, none of these industries was pursuing new
activities where learning or dynamic economies of scale might have been important. As in other
countries, these interventions probably reflected political considerations and fears of the effects
of large corporate failures on the banking system. It is fair to say that the government has been
more successful in disengaging itself from sunrise industries than from sunset industries.
The government has also remained closely involved in credit policy. Moreover, its basic
role in rationing credit has in turn forced it to become involved in many additional ad hoc
regulations. In 1989, for example, the government became concerned that the chaebol were
using bank credit to speculate in real estate rather than to invest in manufacturing. It is
understandable why they should have wanted to do so: since the profitability of real estate
investments was in effect determined by the high cost of funds in the nonpreferred sectors, the
chaebol could earn very attractive margins on money borrowed at commercial bank rates. Thus
the government had to invent a new decree that required conglomerates to divest themselves of
"excess land holdings," and it eventually bought land from the companies at handsome prices.
Efforts to limit the chaebols' share to 65 percent of new low-cost bank loans have created
a similar chain of unintended interventions. Faced with the deteriorating export performance
of several major companies, the government sought a way to make additional funds available
for productive investment. To justify the additional credit, the chaebol were told to select three
core operations for specialization, which would be exempted from credit limits. Many chose
their most capital-intensive activities, including especially petrochemicals-certainly not the
industries that Korea needs to foster for the future. It is not clear whether or not the government
2/ See J.H. Kim (1990) for a complete review.
3/ See World Bank (1987, Volume 2) for a case study of the textile industry.
4/ The Law of Special Measures for the Stabilization of Specific Depressed Industries
was adopted in 1978, with a five-year horizon, and was then replaced in 1983 by the
Law of Special Measures for the Structural Improvement of Specific Industries. See
Peck, Levin and Goto (1985) and World Bank (1987, Volume 2) for details.
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simply aimed to make more credit available to the chaebol and used the specialization directive
merely to make the policy more palatable.
What is clear is that access to credit remains rationed and politically determined, and it
repeatedly involves the government in questionable new pronouncements and regulations.
Controlled systems are always subject to abuse, as several recent incidents illustrate, the interest
differentials that arise from domestic and international capital controls produce a great temptation
for selling access to bank credit, and for bringing foreign capital into domestic capital markets.
These pressures suggest a need for new approaches to financial policy, as well as clearer
policies of regulatory control. In Korea's increasingly politicized environment, reformed
institutions much more than bureaucratic oversight are needed for economic supervision. Also
at stake is the governments' relationship with the chaebol. Each new effort to control chaebol
behavior generates new mistrust between business and government-a trend that is reinforced
by popular resentment against the chaebols' economic power. Yet these developments reduce
the likelihood of a cooperative business-government relationship, such as exists in Germany or
Japan.
Domestic Enviromnent in the 1990s
There has been more political change in Korea during the last five years than in the
previous 20, and the transformation of the country's political institutions is likely to proceed
rapidly in the future. A similar acceleration of change is evident in the international economic
environment, where the emergence of new regional blocs and the challenges of socialist
transition are likely to trigger major global economic realignments. These forces require new
approaches with regard both to policy goals and to the instruments used to pursue them.
Sophistication. Savings rates are setting new records, and investment remains high in
both physical and human capital. The relative size of the technology-intensive sector has
expanded, and the economy's manufacturing sector is becoming far more sophisticated and
diversified. Many Korean firms now rank among the world's largest companies and are
becoming more thoroughly integrated into the world economy through corporate alliances and
foreign investments. The growing complexity of the economy implies a larger gap between the
technical information available to firms and that available to the government. Moreover, more
sophisticated markets and larger firms are better able to evade or circumvent government
directives.
The changing capabilities of the economy also affect the rationale for intervention. The
objectives of the 1960s and 1970s-gaining experience in risk taking and in the acquisition of
foreign technology-are less applicable today. Korea has acquired enormous experience with
importing technology; its private sector is alert to new opportunities and understands its own
capabilities. Korean companies are experienced in international markets and no longer need the
stimulus of government intervention to look abroad.
- 16 -
The new directions of the economy suggest, however, that technology-related market
failures may be increasingly important. New technology inevitably leaks out, to the benefit of
firms other than those investing in it. New industries may involve learning externalities-one
firm's experience facilitates the growth of the whole industry through human capital investments
or the development of subcontractors. Evidence of such externalities can be found in the
extensive geographical and national clustering of high-technology industries. An especially
important source of market failure is human capital. Because Korean workers move a great deal
from company to company (like U.S. workers, but unlike Japanese workers), individual firms
have insufficient incentive to invest in human capital. This leaves this important form of
investment to private capital markets, which are notoriously flawed in financing human capital
investment.
Changing goals. Economic progress is likely to remain a preeminent goal in Korea, but
the relative importance of other, competing factors is rising. Rising incomes allow people to
pay more attention to issues such as the environment, housing, health, and equity. In addition,
the relative political weight of the middle and working classes is increasing as the political
process becomes more open. Thus government is under great pressure to show improvements
in the standard of living and in the distribution of the fruits of economic progress. There is also
pressure to avoid policies that might raise the suspicion that specific companies or individuals
are being helped to become rich at the expense of society.
It is tempting to argue that these changing attitudes will shift priorities from investment
to consumption. Yet the experience of high-growth countries, including Japan, demonstrates that
savings and investment can remain high even as income levels rise. During rapid growth,
incomes outpace households' ability to increase consumption and savings rise. However,
countries experiencing rapid growth often find their stock of social investments to be insufficient,
and are thus likely shift the structure of investment toward public goods such as infrastructure,
housing, safety, and the environment. Social investments are capital-intensive, and like the HCI
investments of the 1970s, could lead to a general scarcity of capital in other branches of
economic activity.
Pluralism. Korea's economic ministries, like those of Japan, have a tradition of
considerable decision-making capacity and authority. Economic policy has been implemented
by relatively independent ministries, with little day-to-day intervention from the political process.
But Korea's ability to maintain this Japanese-like separation between politics and economic
decision making is under challenge; the government's political position is more fragile. Through
the inclusion of the opposition in the DLP (Democratic Liberal Party), the architects of Korea's
political process are clearly aiming to achieve the stability that underpins Japan's political model.
Whether this initiative will succeed is unclear; Korea's societal structure and political process
are more adversarial than those of Japan and, at least for now, seem to involve more direct
conflict over economic objectives. This foreshadows much greater political involvement in
future economic decisions. In such a political context, it has been argued in the United States,
it is preferable to have no strong instruments of industrial policy that are vulnerable to political
exploitation.
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External Environment in the 1990s
Korean industrial policy will have to face various worldwide changes that affect the
incidence of market failures and restrict the utility of various policy instruments.
Technology. Recent technological trends have dramatically shortened the life cycles of
products, especially in electronics, machinery, and automobiles. These trends are changing the
importance of various factors of production: knowhow is becoming more valuable, and raw labor
less so. To remain internationally competitive, a company must pioneer, or at least rapidly
copy, new features in its product line. Japan has emerged as a leader in these skills and is
developing new competitive approaches-for example, made-to-order automobile
manufacturing-that are designed to increase the importance of technology and design.
Computer-aided design and manufacturing contribute to these trends, since they reduce the time
and cost involved in implementing rapid product changes.
In some industries product turnover is associated with increasingly large and risky
technological investments. In semiconductor manufacturing, for example, there are multiple
technical solutions for achieving a particular product, and unless a company pursues all
approaches, it may risk not participating in a given generation of technology and perhaps falling
far behind for many years. To a lesser extent, similar considerations apply even in conventional
industries such as automobiles, where each model now has to generate substantial sales over a
shrinking life cycle in order to break even. Under these circumstances, large companies in all
major countries have begun to establish alliances and partnerships for sharing the risks involved
in developing new technology.
To participate in this high-level competition, Korean firms will have to be comparable
in size and capabilities to their foreign competitors. In fact, Korea's chaebol are quite successful
in attracting major foreign partners-consider, for example the collaborations between Hyundai
and Mitsubishi, Daewoo and General Motors, and Goldstar and Hitachi. Samsung is perhaps
the most successful example of a firm that has reached a global stage of development; it
manufactures a broad range of products and has now succeeded as one of the first companies
in the world to develop the 64-megabyte RAM memory chip. Thus Korea's electronics output
in 1991 is expected to be the fourth-largest in the world (behind the United States, Japan, and
Germany), and nearly double that of Taiwan (Clifford 1991).
It is sometimes argued that Taiwanese development patterns, which were less favorable
to large firms, have also resulted in internationally competitive industries. (Unlike Korea,
Taiwan used market interest rates to provide relatively equal access to credit by all sectors.)
Indeed, Yoo (1990) has found that despite the credit preference given to heavy and chemicai
industries in Korea, the two countries were roughly equally successful in increasing their export
shares to the OECD in heavy and chemical industries. It appears that Taiwan's smaller, equity-
financed companies have been faster at responding to new market opportunities. But a closer
examination of the evidence also shows that Taiwan has been less able to maintain its market
positions over a longer period of time and has had to shift production abroad to keep down labor
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costs (Mody 1989). Most experts judge the long-term prospects of Korean companies to be
supenor.
Yet the lessons go both ways. As a result of directing credit to larger companies, Korea
has a much weaker infrastructure of small-component and part suppliers than Taiwan. Its larger
companies are too diversified and need to become nimbler. At the same time, Taiwan has
recently begun to foster larger-scale investments, for example through a publicly funded venture-
capital fund. The recently announced government-funded joint venture with McDonnell-Douglas
in aircraft production represents an especially vivid commitment to larger-scale manufacturing.
More International Players. Competition in international manufacturing is expanding,
reflecting the declining cost of communications and a worldwide trend toward more open,
investment-friendly policies. The new manufacturing powerhouses include not only China and
ASEAN, but also Latin American economies such as Mexico and Chile, and eventually, one
expects, the formerly socialist economies of Eastern Europe. These countries cannot yet
challenge the technological lead of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore in key manufacturing
industries; but with the support of sizable direct investments from Japan, other advanced
countries, and the NIEs themselves, they are rapidly moving into advanced manufacturing.
The internationalization of manufacturing is facilitated by the "disaggregation" of
manufacturing processes into several stages, with each stage implemented in the most
advantageous locale. Computers and advanced communications now make it possible to
coordinate increasingly complex production chains. Such chains might include, for example,
the manufacturing of sophisticated components in Japan, the manufacturing of more standardized
components in Thailand or Indonesia, and final assembly or marketing activities in a low-wage
country or in a final market such as the United States. In some cases, technological hubs such
as Singapore coordinate manufacturing operations by sourcing components throughout East Asia.
These technological trends are strongly reinforced by the internationalization of the
Japanese economy, which is driven by the high yen, high savings, and shortage of labor in
Japan. Capital outflows have been also facilitated by the liberalization of Japanese finance;
Japanese investors are aggressively exploiting the large differentials between domestic and
foreign rates of return that emerged under earlier financial constraints. The pace of investment
in East Asia has slowed in recent months, but the underlying trends are robust, and they are
likely to spread to other parts of the world that achieve a suitably stable and open economic
environment.
New Regional Alignments. European integration, now planned to encompass a single
market of 250 million people and a still wider Free Trade Area, will create a large, but perhaps
also less easily accessible market. The proposed North American Free Trade Area will generate
a market of similar size, and with time might also include several Latin American countries.
The truly novel feature of these regional alignments is that each includes its own potential low-
wage manufacturing base. Thus the agreements may divert investment away from traditional
manufacturing bases such as East Asia and into Latin America and Eastern Europe, which enjoy
more secure access to European and North American markets.
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Pacific Asia, at the same time, is steadily becoming more important both as a market and
a source of supply. Despite such proposals as the East Asian Economic Grouping, no major,
formal economic agreement is likely to emerge in the near term (Petri 1992 [forthcoming]), but
ongoing market forces will continue to increase actual economic integration. Especially rapid
progress is likely in some "growth triangles"- including perhaps a triangle that links Korea with
Pacific Russia and western Japan- which involve small free-trade areas (FTAs) designed to
exploit intense, local trading opportunities. Eventually, these smaller FTAs may provide further
impetus for general liberalization. The ultimate impact of these trends cannot be assessed
precisely, but Korea's trade, too, is likely to shift toward Pacific Asia.
With or without blocs, the trading environment in Europe and North America is likely
to become more demanding, in part because Korean industry is increasingly competing directly
against European and American firms. After the Uruguay Round, there will also be new
disputes over the implementation of developing-country agreements on market access, especially
in services. The enforcement of subsidies and other disciplines is likely to become stricter. The
financial sector is bound to play an increasingly contentious role in trade diplomacy, both
because it represents a key service and because preferential access to credit is a form of
subsidization. These trends will further constrain Korea's traditional tools of industrial policy.
In sum, the foregoing yields five key conclusions on the objectives and implementation
of industrial policy:
1. The rationale for intervention is shifting from conventional infant industry arguments to
technological and strategic issues. The latter are best addressed by functional rather than
selective interventions.
2. The key instruments of selective industrial policy-especially directed credit- are
becoming ineffective because they can be evaded by large, sophisticated, internationally-
connected companies. Continued efforts to rely on these instruments undermine the
government's credibility and lead to a deterioration of business-government relationships.
3. Although they create problems for the execution of industrial policy, large companies are
essential for building Korea's international competitiveness in technology-intensive
industry.
4. Selective interventions are also constrained by domestic perceptions of unfairness and an
increasingly contentious international trade policy environment.
5. The risks involved in maintaining a system of selective interventions are growing because
(i) the government is less able to guide Korea's increasingly complex economy, and (ii)
Korea's economic decisions are increasingly shaped by political rather than economic
considerations.
The remaining sections of this paper analyze the implications of these conclusions for future
policy directions.
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KOREAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THIE 1990s
Despite substantial adjustments during the past decade, Korean industrial policy continues
to be dominated by the goals and instruments of the 1970s. These are increasingly ineffective
and inappropriate in the 1990s, and they undermine the government's efforts to establish a long-
term economic strategy. In the interest of greater clarity and predictability, a new approach
needs to be developed, including a "new compact" between business and government.
A key problem that underlies many of the contradictions of recent industrial policy is the
government's ambivalence toward the chaebol. We have argued that Korea needs strong,
independent companies to pursue global technologies and markets. The government appears to
recognize this point and has given the chaebol considerable support. Yet it is also concerned
about the power of the chaebol and has been reluctant to abandon financial and other instruments
that allow it to control chaebol behavior. The result has been inconsistent, ad hoc interventions,
as well as conflicts and policy mistakes. This dynamic is damaging the government's credibility
in economic policy, and it undermines efforts to establish a cooperative business-government
relationship.
The key issue is: Who should guide the industrial sector-the financial sector, industry
itself, or government? In most successful advanced economies, decision-making authority rests
in the hands of those best able to judge market opportunities-industrial firms and the financial
sector. Inevitably, Korea must also move in this direction. But as lender of last resort, the
government also has the responsibility to ensure that financial markets exercise appropriate
discipline. Strong, independent monitoring agencies will be required for this task.
Putting this another way, we favor giving conglomerates full responsibility for their
futures, but only subject to transparent and rigorously enforced rules. We favor independence
for banks, but also subject to regulations that insure safety through adequate capital and
supervision. Adopting this approach would represent a radical departure from Korea's past
policies. It would require the strengthening of independent regulatory institutions, such as the
Bank of Korea (BOK), Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), and the Office of Bank
Supervision and Examination, as well as the creation of new ones, such as Bank Examination
Offices for nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) and govemment banks.
Financial-sector reform is complicated by the fact that the financial system has not
adequately dealt with the losses it has suffered during earlier periods of government-directed
lending. Yet this is not a reason for maintaining a high level of government involvement in
financial-sector governance. The legacy of past financial crises should be tackled, once and for
all, by bold, transparent solutions to the problem of nonperforming loans, such as the issue of
new govemment debt to replace irretrievably lost assets. As part of the deal that makes the
commercial banks viable, they should be given full authority and responsibility for maintaining
sound portfolios in the future.
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At the same time, the government's profile should rise in other areas. Above all, the
government must ensure that the policy environment is stable and predictable-that is, conducive
to rational private planning and high rates of saving and investment. This requires, in addition
to the well-known macroeconomic policies, new institutions of dialogue between business, labor,
and government. It also requires efforts to improve public perceptions of economic progress in
such areas as tax policy, infrastructure development, and social programs.
Education and applied research, including cooperative ventures that improve the
dissemination of technology within Korea, represent likely areas of market failure and should
be supported vigorously. The government should also encourage private investments in
technology-intensive industries. Many of these policies can be implemented through a modern,
functional incentive system-for example, through investment- and education-oriented tax
policies. The government also needs to play an aggressive role in assuring access to key
markets through negotiations and aid.
These changes would shift the focus of government activity but by no means diminish
the government's overall role in economic affairs. The government would pursue economic
progress by clarifying its vision of a technology-based society, enhancing the country's
technological resource base, and encouraging private investment and technological progress.
The govemment would also foster a consensus-oriented decision-making system by disengaging
itself from the increasingly acrimonious relationship with private business and by focusing more
attention on public goods such as safety, environmental protection, and infrastructure. To do
so requires the strengthening of financial institutions to provide the oversight of the use of the
nation's considerable savings and a clear regulatory structure to ensure its fair application.
In the following sections, we consider the ramifications of this general approach in four
specific areas: chaebol policy, financial-sector policy, competition policy, and trade policy.
Chaebol Policy
Korea's large, closely held conglomerates cast a long shadow over many aspects of
industrial policy. Financial-sector policies, for example, are closely linked to the chaebol issue
because the government has relied on the credit allocation process to influence chaebol behavior.
Regulatory policy is also tied to chaebol policy because the conglomerates exercise market
power in many sectors of the economy. Because the chaebol are largely owned by individuals
(see Table 19.9), policies toward the chaebol are inevitably colored by issues of equity and
social justice.
Yet the chaebol have played a central role in Korea's industrial development and are
vitally important to the future success of Korea's technology-intensive industries. Policy toward
the chaebol is also complicated by the fact that these companies are highly leveraged and have
enormous appetites for investment capital. In the face of these conflicting demands on policy,
the government's attitude has been ambivalent. Efforts to liberalize the financial system have
been slowed by the government's desire to make low-cost capital available to the chaebol and
to control their behavior. Share ownership has been restricted and the selection of bank
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Table 19.9: Ownership of large business groups
Share of ownership (%)
Group Total
Group Individuals companies clan control
Hyundai 27.5 40.3 67.8
Daewoo 9.8 40.6 50.4
Samsung 8.5 44.7 53.2
Lucky-Goldstar 7.6 30.6 38.3
Hanjin 27.7 24.3 52.0
Ssangyong 7.6 34.4 42.0
Sunkyung 21.5 29.1 50.6
Korea Explosives 10.5 30.8 41.4
Daelim 7.6 31.6 39.2
Lotte 3.6 20.0 23.6
Average of top 5 groups - - 52.4
Average of top 10 groups - - 48.2
Average of 61 large
business groups - - 47.1
Source: EPB data submitted to National Assembly. Data as of April, 1991.
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managers has been heavily influenced by the government in order to keep the chaebol from
assuming control over the banks. And as we have shown, efforts to ration credit to the chaebol
in the face of their inevitably high demand for below-market-rate credit, have led to a chain of
contradictory interventions.
The chaebol dilemma has driven Korean industrial policy into gridlock. The government
is reluctant to transfer decision-making authority to market institutions because it fears that the
chaebol will capture the banks and abuse their power. At the same time, the govemment's
continuing role in the economy prevents the emergence of independent private institutions, such
as powerful banks, that could impose financial discipline on chaebol behavior. In the meantime,
the government's instruments of control are becoming less effective, the directions of industrial
policy are becoming confused, and the relationship between the government and business, instead
of moving toward harmony, is turning confrontational.
The best way to address this dilemma is to relax direct financial controls on the chaebol,
and to shift the job of controlling the chaebol to independent regulatory bodies, and to greater
private-sector competition in both the financial and industrial sectors of the economy. This "new
compact" would give the chaebol more freedom in raising and spending money, both at home
and abroad. At the same time, it would subject them to stricter regulation and greater
competition. The end result would be checks on chaebol behavior administered by private
institutions and markets instead of government. This would free the government to pursue
broader micro- and macroeconomic objectives.
With greater private-sector autonomy, some of the distortions that now lead to conflict
and uneconomic actions could, with appropriate oversight, be eliminated. Interest differentials
between bank and nonbank instruments would narrow, removing the temptation for arbitrage.
With greater private participation (even if by the chaebol themselves) the banks would assume
greater responsibility in lending and in corporate oversight. Of course, these changes require
"cleaning up" the inherited capital structures of both firms and banks, which would otherwise
not be viable in a commercial context. None of these changes would have to be implemented
overnight-unlike Eastern Europe, the Korean economy is functioning very well-but a
predictable, preannounced strategy is needed to signal a viable transition trajectory. In the
following sections, we explore the implications of this strategy for financial-sector policy,
competition policy, and trade policy.
Flnancial Sector Policy
The financial sector has not yet achieved the level of maturity common in other East
Asian countries, let alone the OECD countries.5/ Until recently, for example, Korea had a
virtually non-existent equity market. With government's desire in the 1980s to reduce the
leveraging of Korean firms, the stock market expanded, with chaebol issuing equities but
retaining large shares for individual owners. Almost three-quarters of Korean equity shares in
5/ For a review of financial issues, see Nam (1990, 1991).
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1988 were held by individuals, compared to a quarter in Japan (see Hahn 1989). Japan has
made the transition from first generation ownership and now approximately 73 percent of shares
are held by corporate owners, e.g., banks, trusts, and corporations compared with a mere 31
percent in 1949 and 57 percent in 1970.
There are, of course, many different models for organizing the relationship between
"banks" and "industry"; but in each of the advanced countries there is substantial, independent
decision-making authority vested in financial institutions. A weak financial sector may have
suited Korean policymakers in the past, because it permitted government to pursue an active
industrial policy. It is now a liability, which undermines the country's resource-allocation
process.
The issue of financial liberalization is intricately linked to industrial policy. Prior to
1988, half of the funding for the corporate sector was derived from bank and nonbank debt
issues, 20-25 percent from borrowing from abroad, and approximately a quarter from stock
issue. Much of this credit was subject to an elaborate credit control system (CCS) established
in 1974, which has allowed government to exercise considerable control over the flow of credit
to specific industrial activities and different types of industrial borrowers.
Despite several rounds of liberalization since 1974, credit-based interventions have
remained important in the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1984, for example, government froze the
credit share of the largest 30 firms and cut off credit altogether to firms with debt/equity ratios
above 500 percent. These policies were eventually reversed, though restrictions continued on
the real estate or cross-corporate investments of the 49 largest conglomerates. In 1987 the
government "urged" 82 firms with 50 billion won or more in bank loans to repay a total of 1
trillion won by issuing public stock. And in 1991 it ordered them to select three core business
lines, promising to provide these with better access to credit.
The key to eliminating the need for these interventions is to make the financial sector
independent. In a private financial system, effectively regulated and supervised, firms would
have clear financial incentives to issue equity, to pursue promising business ventures, and to
abstain from high-risk investments. One argument that is frequently used against the full
privatization of the banks is that they would be controlled by the chaebol themselves. According
to the Office of Bank Supervision and Examination, the top 10 conglomerates officially own
about 20 percent of the top six commercial banks. As Table 19.10 shows, the role of large
shareholders is even greater in nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs). Conglomerates also
increased the number of NBFIs they owned-the top 10 owned 31 NBFIs in 1989-because the
credit obtained from them is not subject to the same credit controls as normal bank credit.6/
To prevent chaebol ownership, the government limits bank credits to a single customer
and bank ownership by a single customer to 8 percent of capital. Of course, because corporate
ownership is hard to trace, this restriction probably does not limit ownership as much as it
6/ The conglomerates have also used their NBFIs to circumvent regulations, such as the
9.27.80 decree halting further real estate purchases by the chaebol.
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Table 19.10. Ownership structure of financial intermediaries: end of 1989 (Percent)
Investment Merchant
Five NCBs Provincial & finance Securities banking All listed
banks cos. companies corps. companies
Securities companies 3.4 2.8 1.4 2.7 9.6 5.1
Insurance companies 14.2 3.5 0.8 2.8 0.4 2.6
Other financial 3.2 1.9 6.2 7.5 35.4 3.2
intermediaries
Nonfinancial corporations' 17.2 20.7 18.3 24.8 14.2 20.6
Foreigners 0.0 2.7 0.7 1.8 23.8 2.1
Domestic individuals 61.8 68.5 72.4 60.3 16.4 54.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.Ob
Small shareholders 77.7 76.0 66.6 65.5 55.1 -
Corporations 14.5 11.2 10.5 14.2 40.3 -
Individuals 63.1 64.8 58.1 51.4 14.7 -
Largest stockholders 5.8 9.4 16.1 26.2 17.6 -
Other stockholders 16.5 14.6 17.3 8.3 27.2 -
Corporations 16.0 11.5 7.7 6.8 25.2 -
Individuals 0.5 3.0 9.5 1.6 2.0 -
Source: Nani (1990).
Note: Includes listed companies only: 10 provincial banks, 29 investment and finance companies, 22 securities
companies, and three merchant ba ing corporations. Figures are simple averages.
Includes *ecurities investment companies.
b Includes 11.8 percent held by government-invested companies.
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appears. But if the 8 percent rule did work, it would distribute ownership responsibility so
widely across different owners that banks would face little effective shareholder oversight.
As Nam (1990) has argued, it would be better to regulate the behavior of banks and the
chaebol than to limit bank ownership. Indeed, since NBFI ownership is currently unregulated,
it makes good sense to develop a comprehensive system of prudential regulation instead of
ownership rules that have questionable merit, are difficult to enforce, and lack credibility. We
now examine the implications of such a regulatory regime for (i) the central bank, (ii) bank
supervisory agencies, and (iii) the financial intermediaries themselves.
Central Bank. The advantages of central bank autonomy are well known; a number of
studies have shown that independent central banks tend to be associated with low-inflation
environments because they are more insulated from the political process (Cargill 1988). In
Korea, maintaining a low rate of inflation has been a traditional national policy objective, and
the Bank of Korea (BOK), much like the Bank of Japan, has pursued this objective despite its
close ties to the Ministry of Finance. With recent political changes, however, the case for
insulating the BOK from political pressures, more along the model of Germany or the United
States, is becoming stronger.
Commercial banks would have been unable to provide policy-based loans without the
backing of the BOK. The BOK has provided substantial overdraft privileges, reaching at times
7-10 percent of the commercial banks' asset base, and a special window to rediscount policy
loans. Rather than calling in nonperforming loans, commercial banks have been able to pass
on their balance-sheet problems to the BOK, shifting the cost of policy errors to the least
transparent portion of the financial system-the central bank's income statement. In the new
regulatory regime, the BOK should abstain from lending to financial institutions, except
according to guidelines that reflect the bank's responsibilities for monetary policy and the safety
of Korea's financial system.
Industrial policy has also affected financial-sector policy in the sphere of interest-rate
determination. Interest ceilings have enabled preferred creditors to borrow at rates well below
those available to others. Minister Sakong's liberalization program of 1988 was only partially
carried out and a recent study found that "lending rates and most rates in the primary securities
market are still very rigid and unresponsive to market conditions, indicating that the Korean
financial market is still far from being fully integrated and operating purely on a competitive
basis. This phenomenon seems to be partly due to limited interest rate deregulation and partly
to an inertia and mentality inherited from the time when most financial institutions were run like
public enterprises" (Nam 1991:15). Further interest-rate deregulation is thus required,
particularly since the capital market will eventually have to be opened to foreigners.
Bank Supervision. The legacy of government intervention is still evident in the balance
sheets of commercial banks. Korean banks are marginally profitable, but serious portfolio
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problems have been rolled over for many years.7/ Past attempts to clean up balance sheets
have not been fully successful, nor has provisioning against potential losses been as vigorous as
needed. Between 1985 and 1988 alone some 9.8 trillion won in financial assistance was
provided to restructured firms at government behest.8/ Thus, at the end of March 1988, 16
percent of commercial bank loans were to firms designated under official rationalization
programs. Of 650 billion won in uncollected interest payments by commercial banks, more than
two-thirds were owed by rationalized firms. These losses depressed bank net profits relative to
total assets, which reached an all-time low of 0.19 percent. Reforms in loan loss provisioning,
capital requirements, and lending rules are essential for strengthening banks and introducing
greater discipline in the financial sector.
The supervision of commercial banks in Korea is the responsibility of the Office of Bank
Supervision and Examination, an agency affiliated closely with the BOK. The NBFI sector,
which now intermediates 60 percent of financial savings, is regulated by the Ministry of Finance.
In most developed countries, bank supervisory agencies are independent and subject to
transparent reporting requirements. To be sure, regulatory independence is not always sufficient
for proper oversight, as is so evident in the case of the U.S. savings and loan crisis. But it is
also true, as demonstrated by the recent financial scandals in Japan, that ministries of finance
have too many other conflicting goals to operate effectively as an overseeing body. A separation
of the regulatory/supervisory functions from government business and political influence is a
necessary, although not sufficient, requirement for effective supervision.
Supervision is made difficult in Korea by the widespread practice of cross-corporate
guarantees. Affiliates of the chaebol endorse each other's liabilities, so that the distinction
between active and contingent liabilities is blurred. BOK data submitted to the National
Assembly suggest that conglomerates in Korea have offered payment guarantees on liabilities
equal to at least three times their net worth. For the top five chaebol, their potential liabilities
exceed their net worth by a factor of 3.7 (see Table 19.11). Banks are not able to say with
clarity what capital is being pledged as collateral for a given liability. Overall lending by
conglomerates is not tallied in a way that makes it possible to assess the risks facing a bank's
portfolio. This problem is exacerbated by the blurred line between personal borrowing by
chaebol owners and corporate borrowing, weak corporate disclosure requirements, and generally
weak coordination among regulatory agencies.9/
7/ Profitability is directly related to the share of non-performing loans in nationwide
commercial banks, according to P.J. Kim as reported in Nam (1991).
8/ This included, according to Office of Bank Supervision and Examination data reported
by Nam (1991), funds to subsidize interest rates for restructured industries, extended
grace periods on repayments, fresh concessional funds to firms taking over
unprofitable firms as part of official workout and placement of firms, and straight
writeoffs.
2/ See Nam (1990) for a discussion of regulation of the securities market.
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Table 19.11. Net worth and debt-payment guarantee of core business of conglomerates: August
1991
Debt-payment
guarantee by Guarantees
Net worth core business per won of
(bil won) (bil won) net worth
Group (A) (B) (B/A)
Hyundai 1,332 2,168 1.6
Daewoo 1,218 5,364 4.4
Samsung 1,195 5,782 4.8
Lucky-Goldstar 1,295 4,507 3.5
Hanjin 390 2,108 5.4
Ssangyong 1,052 1,980 1.9
Sunkyung 759 689 0.9
Korea Explosives 734 1,974 2.7
Daelim 3 631 233.7
Lotte 235 29 0.1
Average of top 5 groups 5,430 19,929 3.7
Average of top 10 groups 8,213 25,232 3.1
Average of top 30 groups 12,413 38,433 3.1
Source: BOK data submitted to National Assembly.
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Many of these issues have been addressed by supervisory agencies and by the CAMEL
system recommended by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).IQ/ The BIS has also
proposed a risk-adjusted approach to capital adequacy, and this has been adopted in principle by
most OECD countries and should be operationalized by 1992. The approach requires banks to
categorize their assets by risk categories. In the Korean context, for example, loans for
speculative real estate purchases would be rated differently from plant and equipment investment,
as would loans backed by tangible assets from loans guaranteed by other chaebol affiliates.
Appropriate risk-based capital requirements would encourage the risk-adjusted pricing of capital
and would make it unnecessary to apply special ad hoc constraints on bank portfolios or lending
activities. 1 1/
Bank and Nonbank Intermediaries. Bank management is still not independent in
Korea, with most CEOs appointed or recommended by government. According to Nam (1991),
policy loans still account for almost half of domestic credit, including the lending of government
banks to industry, agriculture, and housing. Banks and NBFIs cannot charge risk-based prices
for capital. Entry into the banking sector is restricted and price competition is limited. These
factors have retarded the development of independent financial intermediaries. Banks and other
financial institutions have not been able to exercise purely commercial judgments or to develop
commercial lending expertise.
The effect of a repressed financial sector on industrial development is hard to quantify,
but given Korea's present stage of development, it is almost certainly negative. Compared to
either Japanese or Taiwanese statistics, Korea's financial deepening is low, as measured for
example by the ratio of domestic financial assets to GNP. Although equity financing is
increasing, the debt-equity ratios of Korean firms still make them vulnerable to interest-rate
cycles. These problems affect not only the allocation of resources, but also severely constrain
the use of monetary policy as a tool of macroeconomic management. In addition, the slow
development of the financial sector makes it difficult to liberalize the service and capital
accounts, despite growing international pressure in these areas.
In sum, Korea needs to develop a stronger, more competitive, and more independent
banking sector. This will require settling on a one-time basis the questionable portfolios of
commercial banks. It will also require a transfer of decision-making authority to shareholders
and the managers who represent them. To check the potential abuse of these new opportunities,
supervisory practices will have to be strengthened and barriers to entry reduced. These changes
cannot occur overnight, but far more rapid progress is possible than experienced during the
1980s. With such changes, the Korean financial sector can begin to accumulate the authority
1Q/ CAMEL refers to examinations of a bank's capital, assets, management, equity and
liquidity.
11/ Direct controls on real estate lending activity have also proved ineffective in Japan,
where banks founded special (for the most part wholly owned) subsidiaries to
circumvent restrictions on their real estate portfolios. Many of these subsidiaries are
now in severe financial trouble.
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and experience needed to manage resource allocation privately, following the successful models
of Germany and Japan.
Competition Policy
The structure of industrial ownership in Korea is the result of deliberate policies that
concentrated capital in the hands of fast growing firms. Size became an especially important
objective during the heavy and chemical industry drive of the 1970s. Intercompany shareholding
was also permitted, leading to further concentration of ownership. In the wake of these policies,
the chaebol have assumed a commanding position in Korean industry. The top 10 chaebol, for
example, own half of the 100 largest firms and account for 62 percent of the value of
manufacturing shipments (Lee and Lee 1990).
When measured by traditional concentration ratios, however, business concentration in
Korea is similar to that in other countries and has even declined in the last decade. 12/ Nor
do the chaebol seem to focus their activities exclusively in highly concentrated industries (Table
19.12). But the chaebol do play an important role in a majority of those commodities identified
as "market dominating" by the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFFC), that is, in the 131
markets where one producer accounts for more than 50 percent of output or the top three exceed
75 percent of output. More than two-thirds of these products were dominated by the largest 30
chaebol in 1989. (See Lee and Lee 1990.) In more than 80 percent of these markets a
conglomerate had to compete with at most one other conglomerate taken from the top 20 firms.
In effect, a small number of chaebol share markets with each other in a wide variety of
industries. In this setting the temptation to contain competition must be very high.
The first regulatory action of consequence in Korea, the Price-Stabilization and Fair
Trade Act of 1975, was initiated not to improve competition but rather to halt inflation. The
focus was to 'stabilize" markets by designating monopoly products for surveillance and
subsequent price action if the price was found to be excessive. Unfair trading practices were
defined as unwarranted price movements rather than market domination. Worried by the
increased size of the conglomerates, the government introduced a Monopoly Regulation and Fair
Trade Act in 1980 to curb big-business power. The KFTC was strengthened in 1986 with rules
designed to limit economic concentration by restricting intercompany ownershipl3/ and
regulating, for the first time, anticompetitive mergers by business groups. The KFTC took a
step toward independence in 1989, but it is still affiliated with the Economic Planning Board.
12/ Lee and Lee (1990) report that the percentage of shipments accounted for by the
largest 100 firms fell from 45 percent to 39 percent between 1977 and 1987 and that
the employment shares by the top 100 also fell from 24 percent to 20 percent over the
period.
1a/ Investments by large business groups in other companies of the group cannot in total
exceed 40 percent of the net assets of the company.
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Table 19.12. Number of markets in which largest 30 business groups are operating, by market
shares: 1982 and 1987 (Unit: no. of commodities, percent)
Top 5 groups Top 10 groups Top 30 eroups
Market share 1982 1987 1982 1987 1982 1987
Over 80% 33 42 48 64 74 103
(7.2) (6.5) (6.9) (7.4) (6.6) (6.9)
60- 80% 31 38 39 47 58 81
(6.7) (5.9) (5.6) (5.4) (5.2) (5.4)
40- 60% 74 82 92 98 121 151
(16.1) (12.7) (13.2) (11.3) (10.8) (10.1)
20 - 40% 87 141 120 186 190 291
(18.9) (21.8) (17.2) (21.4) (16.9) (19.4)
Less than 20% 236 345 398 494 678 873
(51.2) (53.2) (57.1) (56.8) (60.3) (58.2)
Total 461 648 697 869 1,125 1,499
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Sources: Lee (1986) and Lee and Lee (1990).
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote the percentage of markets.
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Although the concentration in the manufacturing sector declined and intercompany
investments fell in the 1980s, the policy changes did not dramatically change the competitive
environment. In the KFTC's first decade (1980-89) over 2,000 business mergers were approved
and only two rejected. The number of business-group subsidiaries has dramatically increased;
according to KTFC data, there have been 532 horizontal mergers, 369 vertical mergers, and
1,102 diversifications into new business areas. Nor was much progress made on reducing entry
barriers. The government's own assessments indicate that 89 key industries were subject to
regulatory entry barriers in 1988. Some 218 regulatory statutes in 54 laws affected these
industries, with many regulations on entry, standards, pricing, lines of business, production
capacity, and geographic markets (EPB 1991:6).
In international perspective, Korean competition policy appears to lie closer to that of the
European Economic Community (EEC) than that of the United States. In the U.S. antitrust laws
actively discouraged monopolistic and collusive behavior by preventing mergers among
competitors and by dissolving monopolies such as Standard Oil, American Tobacco, and more
recently AT&T. U.S. deregulation policies have promoted vigorous competition, which in the
case of airline deregulation have produced particularly large-scale entry and exit from the
industry. Competition policy has been less vigorously enforced in the post-Reagan era.
Audretsch (1989) notes that, in the EEC, industrial policy encourages size for
international competitiveness, while competition policy discourages market-dominating positions.
Individual European countries, however, have taken a permissive approach. France actively
encourages mergers to create national champion firms. In Germany, cartels can be legal if
registered; 241 cartels existed in Germany in 1983 (Audretsch 1989), of which 52 were focused
on foreign markets.
In Japan the total number of legal cartels was 505 in 1982, including 59 export cartels.
In both Germany and Japan structurally depressed industries are eligible for rationalization
programs, including government-organized cartels. While the fair-trade concept in Japan is
patterned on U.S. antitrust laws, in reality antitrust exemptions and legal cartels are much closer
to the norm (see Caves and Uekusa 1976, Audretsch 1989, and Ueno 1980 for further
discussion). Small- and medium-industry cartels, often regional rather than industry-specific,
exist for long periods, as do rationalization cartels created under depressed industry laws.
Like other countries with ambitious industrial policies, Korea has consistently encouraged
its conglomerates to be competitive internationally and has not intervened aggressively to create
competition at home. In 1987 only 44 percent of Korean domestic markets (by sales volume)
were classified as competitive, with "competitive" defined as the top three firms controlling less
than 60 percent of the market (Lee and Lee 1990). Evidence on the degree to which firms
exploit their oligopoly positions is not available, but Korea may fall into that group of countries
where many consumer goods (including consumer goods made in Korea) seem to be more
expensive in Korea than in other countries.
Should Korea pursue a more aggressive approach toward competition? The answer is
probably so. While present policies appear to benefit producers at the expense of consumers,
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consumers' losses can be limited by setting the barriers to imports at a low level. Since most
large companies actively compete in foreign markets, they have a strong incentive to improve
productivity and reduce costs. The key is to provide adequate regulatory incentives for true gains
to be passed on to domestic consumers as well. In theory, as long as import barriers are
relatively low, competition policy is redundant; foreign competition can provide market
discipline at low administrative cost. Experience in other countries has shown, however, that
import discipline can be circumvented and it is important for Korea to avoid this trap.
Moreover, it may be even more important to focus competition policy on nontraded industries.
Trade Policy
Trade policy needs to be closely integrated with industrial policy. Korea's exceptional
success in international markets argues for careful adjustments that maintain the momentum of
past achievements. Particularly important are policies that maintain market access to Korea's
key export markets, such as the United States; initiatives that diversify Korea's trade toward
countries emerging as important new markets; and policies that maintain the competitiveness of
Korean companies. Below, we consider the implications of the industrial policy issues examined
above for export policy and import policy, respectively.
Export Policy. Although the fundamental features of Korea's pioneering export
promotion system (an unusually effective drawback system implemented through the domestic
letter of credit and automatic access to low-cost export finance) remain in place, the direct
subsidies implemented during the early stages of export promotion (such as tax advantages to
exporters, excessive wastage allowances on duty-free imports, and highly subsidized access to
long-term capital) have long since been dismantled. This is a good thing, since such policies
would have made its exports to the United States and other countries vulnerable to countervailing
penalties. It should be anticipated that export incentives will weaken somewhat if interest
ceilings are lifted on bank credit.
The major new role of government in the 1980s on the export side has been to be
gatekeeper for domestic industries and negotiator vis-a-vis major markets for access. The
proportion of Korean exports subject to VERs has grown significantly and now accounts for a
major percentage of exports. Clearly the issue of "voluntarily" limiting exports cannot be
separated from access to Korea's market and leads to the difficult policy area of managed trade.
What is clear is that there remains a legitimate economic and political role for govemment in
promoting market access and seeking to maximize national welfare gains.
Tinport Policy. After a substantial liberalization of the import system in the late 1960s,
the share of commodities subject to restrictions increased up to the late 1970s. In the 1980s
Korea sharply expanded the list of liberalized commodities; today more than 95 percent of all
commodities, including virtually all manufactured commodities, are "automatically approved."
Some progress has been made also in abolishing special laws that restrict even automatic
approval commodities.
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Still, questions remain about the openness of the Korean market. The volume of
consumer-goods imports remains low, and the prices of imported goods, especially higher
quality goods, are high in comparison to other markets. Reportedly the government has taken
direct action-including income tax investigations-against purchasers of foreign luxury goods
such as passenger cars (Jacobson 1990). There are also programs that provide low-interest loans
to reduce imports ("localization") and to shift imports from Japan to the United States
("diversification") for selected commodities. In general, the government initially tended to
handle the trade imbalances of the last few years with new policy interventions rather than rapid
adjustments in the exchange rate, both on the upside in 1987-88 and on the downside in
1990-91.
These questions notwithstanding, Korea is very open by international standards, and one
cannot argue that import restrictions are compromising the economy's linkages with world
markets. The export ambitions of Korean companies have kept them intensely engaged in
international competition, with visible benefits in technological progress and productivity. Thus
the question whether interventions should continue hinges on other policy goals.
Korea's future import policy needs to be guided by four broad objectives. On the side
of continued protection, the main argument is that some infant industry protection may be
justified in selected new industries. We would prefer other, functional policies for this purpose.
It is also worth noting that Korea has done exceptionally well in the past in introducing new
products into international markets without significant prior domestic sales (perhaps because
other instruments bore the brunt of the support of new industries).
Three other objectives suggest a further relaxation of restrictions. First, exposure to
international competition is a better approach for controlling the economic power of the chaebol
than an aggressive and acrimonious competition policy. Second, improved access to imported
consumer goods would provide consumers with an important symbol of Korea's increased
standard of living. (As in Japan, high quality consumer goods may also act as a substitute for
increasingly expensive goods in relatively fixed supply, such as real estate and housing.) Third,
a liberal import policy is essential for maintaining market access in the United States and
Europe, and it could help Korea develop new markets in Eastern Europe and Asia. On balance
these arguments call for continued progress on trade liberalization, which in turn implies a
greater role for exchange-rate adjustments in handling cyclical adjustments in the balance of
payments.
TOWARD A NEW BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT COMPACT
Korean industrial policy, which has guided the Korean economy through nearly three
decades of spectacular growth, is showing its age. The policy has not been adjusted fully to the
new challenges facing the economy, and it has not recognized the obsolescence of its key
instruments. This paper has argued that the time has come, as in other advanced industrial
countries, to disengage the government from managing the economy's structural development
and to adopt a new compact to delineate the responsibilities of business and government.
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Under this compact, responsibility for allocating investable funds would be shifted fully
to the industrial and financial sectors, but at the price of greater competitive discipline and
regulatory oversight. Establishing this new framework presents an enormous challenge to
policy. In addition to complexities of the transition, the government will have to maintain
macroeconomic stability and the momentum of savings and investment, tackle the "new" market
failures associated with Korea's rising technological level, and develop new institutions to
increase the flow of information, reduce conflict, and ensure the equitable sharing of the fruits
of economic progress.
What "model" industrial policy is to be sought for Korea today? It is not U.S.-style
policy, since the role advocated here errvisions a more direct and coordinated involvement in the
development of technological resources and the supervision of the financial system. It is not
French-style policy, since it advises against strong interventions through government-arranged
mergers and large-scale policy lending. Of the models reviewed in this paper, it is closest to
the German and Japanese models. These countries are unique in having exceptionally close
working relationships between the financial and industrial sectors. These relationships assure
the availability of long-term capital for the development of new products and industries, and also
impose close supervision and considerable financial discipline on industrial companies. It is hard
to see how a government could improve on the results of these mechanisms, and in both
countries the government has essentially withdrawn from influencing the allocation of credit.
As the Korean financial sector develops into a stronger, independent entity, it may well
generate German- or Japanese-style relationships between financial institutions and their
industrial clients. If the independence of the financial sector is achieved under present
restrictions (effectively enforced) on maximum-share ownership, the result will approximate the
German model, with powerful, independent banks playing the lead role in the finance-industry
relationship. There may well be transitional difficulties with this model because under dispersed
ownership it will take time to establish strong, private control over bank operations, and the
government, as lender of last resort, will have a strong incentive to maintain control. It may
therefore be necessary to use Korea's traditional corporate strength to create (non-family)
banking chaebol to develop Korea's banks into respectable world-class financial institutions.
Though unconventional, this may be the most effective way to strengthen domestic financial
institutions.
If the independence of the financial sector is achieved in the absence of limits on share
ownership, the result is likely to approximate the Japanese financial setup, with industrial
companies closely linked to their group bank through cross-ownership ties. In this scenario,
each major chaebol might acquire and develop a group bank; and being responsible for its safety
and profitability, it would have a strong incentive to use the bank to impose strict financial
discipline on its various subsidiaries.
Korea has used the lessons of Japanese experience very effectively in developing its own
policies in the past. The Japanese model remains attractive at this juncture, but some important
differences are becoming significant. In its early stages, Japanese industrial policy relied on
some of the same instruments that Korea later adopted to encourage investments in infant
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industry and to develop home markets as a base for international competitiveness. But in its
later stages, Japanese policy has moved away from intervention, focusing instead on information
sharing and coordination, and on indirect, functional support for new activities. In this context,
and deprived of its earlier powerful tools, Japanese industrial policy has relied heavily on the
cooperative relationships that bind Japanese business and government, and Japanese business and
labor.
Can Korea base its industrial policy on similar relationships? We would argue, not yet.
Zysman (1983) suggested that an effective industrial policy requires (i) a national consensus on
broad economic goals, (ii) effective policy instruments, and (iii) a forceful bureaucracy. It is
worth reviewing briefly how Korea stands on these criteria.
Korea had a consensus on economic policy through the Fifth Republic, primarily because
the government was strong enough to impose its vision on all critical actors. No similar
cohesiveness seems to exist today. A particularly divisive issue is the distribution of gains from
Korea's phenomenal growth. Long considered a model of equitable growth, Korea is now facing
a widening distribution of wealth (Leipziger et al. 1992) and a less equal distribution of income.
Koreans are no more able to afford housing today than they were 25 years ago. Due to minimal
taxes on capital gains and on earnings on financial assets, many see the tax system as
inequitable. There is considerable public resentment of the skewed distribution of wealth, and
especially of the family-owned chaebol. These concerns can easily explode in protest, as they
did in the massive strikes of 1988 and 1989.
In the absence of a consensus, and given an increasingly pluralistic political process, it
is now likely that industrial policy will be drawn into the political arena, where it will lead to
conflict and debate rather than concerted action. Given this risk, it is best for government to
focus its energies on a broad vision of technological development-consensus surely exists on
this-leaving the more contentious allocational issues to private market forces.
Finally, while Korea's bureaucracy remains highly competent, it too needs to adjust to
new political and economic realities. Despite its elite status, the bureaucracy's power is
declining relative to the legislature and business. Government officials are now frequently called
to testify before the National Assembly, and business and social leaders are increasingly willing
to criticize government policies in public. Rightly or not, the bureaucracy is sometimes viewed
as authoritarian and arbitrary. Policies that exacerbate the conflict between the bureaucracy and
different elements of the public-policies that involve promulgating rules and decisions and
disciplining individuals or companies, even if these enjoy general popular support- will
ultimately reduce the government's effectiveness as a coordinating agent.
Thus, the role of the bureaucracy itself needs to be strengthened by shifting its functions
toward predictable, regulatory, coordinative activities rather than ad hoc policy measures. The
government will need to bridge the interests of producers and consumers, of business and
politicians. These objectives will be best achieved through ongoing consultations and predictable
actions based on statutory powers rather than political imperatives.
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